T HE ADVENT OF commercial space operations opens spacefl ight to broad participation. Historically, career astronauts have been healthy and well trained; however, commercial spacefl ight participants (SFPs) may be older and in less than perfect health. Concern about certain medical conditions causing potential hazards to the nascent fi eld of commercial spacefl ight led to research studies conducted under the FAA ' s Center of Excellence for Commercial Space Transportation to evaluate the impact of the space environment on the health of SFPs. One such issue is the viability of implanted medical devices (IMDs) in the space radiation environment.
IMDs include cardiac pacemakers or defi brillators, insulin pumps, neurostimulators (including vagal, sacral, phrenic, laryngeal, or gastric nerve stimulators), deep brain stimulators, medication pumps, bone growth stimulators, and similar devices. IMDs are placed surgically, with varying lead lengths, and at different locations on or in the body. The devices generally consist of a pulse generator, battery, electrodes, and leads, with circuitry that allows for programming, memory, and even wireless accessibility ( 12 ) . In the United States, around 3 million pacemakers and 1 million defi brillators were implanted between 1993 and 2008, while in 2009 alone over 1 million pacemakers and 300,000 defi brillators were implanted worldwide ( 20 ) .
Ionizing radiation affects electronic circuits by several mechanisms that can lead to device malfunction or failure. Varying sources of radiation form a continuum of energy and effects on electronic devices. Two common effects of radiation on electronic circuits are single event upsets (SEU) and single event latch-ups (SEL) ( 27 ) . SEUs, simply known as " bit flips, " are caused by a single ionizing radiation particle that changes, nearly instantaneously, the state of a memory register. SEL constitutes a state of induced and prolonged current fl ow caused by the interaction of ionizing radiation with the circuit substrate, which can potentially lead to circuitry failures. If SEL occurs, reset of the device may be required to end the latch-up state, provided that no permanent damage has occurred ( 27 ) .
Cardiac implanted devices (CIDs), such as pacemakers or defi brillators, contain circuitry " gates " that pass current when a cardiac electrical impulse is detected ( 13 ) . These gate circuits control the direction of current fl ow by the composition of the substrate material and the number of permeable " holes " in the silicon dioxide substrate. Ionizing radiation causes increased permeability in the silicon dioxide and thereby alters the fl ow pattern of electrons ( 1 , 13 ) . These changes result in aberrant electrical paths that cause temporary or permanent defects, such as premature indication for replacement, inhibited or inappropriate pacing or shock delivery due to over-sensing (interpretation of a cardiac signal when none is present), reversion to reset or safe mode, loss of telemetry, and device failure ( 3 ).
RADIATION & IMPLANTED DEVICES -REYES ET AL.
Five major sources of radiation in the space environment can potentially affect IMDs. The fi rst four are intrinsic to the space environment. First, solar particle events (SPEs) are high-energy solar ejections occurring throughout the 11-yr solar cycle, with the frequency of events increasing during solar maximum. SPEs are generally unpredictable in timing, composition, and energy ( 24 ). SPEs consist mostly of ionized hydrogen nuclei (protons) and a very small amount of helium and heavier particles ( 24 ). The magnetic field and atmosphere of the Earth provide some protection from SPEs, with increasing protection at lower latitudes and altitudes; therefore, higher latitudes and altitudes correspond with increasing radiation dosage. A suborbital fl ight during a large SPE may result in higher exposure ( 24 ). In contrast, the second source of space radiation, trapped charged particles located within the Van Allen radiation belts, are mostly attenuated by geomagnetic and typical spacecraft shielding and are unlikely to be of signifi cant concern for suborbital and short-duration low-Earth orbital spacefl ight ( 25 , 33 ) . In some geographical areas, such as in the South Atlantic Anomaly, the offset and tilt of the geomagnetic fi eld dipole axis from the Earth ' s rotational axis brings these trapped radiation belts closer to the Earth, with decreased geomagnetic shielding from radiation than in other regions. Longerduration orbital spacefl ights that pass through the Anomaly would, therefore, result in SFP exposure to higher levels of radiation ( 2 ) . Again, this is unlikely in short-duration commercial and suborbital spacefl ight operations.
The third source, galactic cosmic radiation (GCR), generally consists primarily of ionized, energetic hydrogen (87%) and alpha particles (12%) with a small contribution ( , 1%) from heavier, high charge and energy (HZE) particles ( 23 -25 ) . HZE particles are rare relative to the hydrogen and helium nuclei, but have a greater ability to penetrate and damage electronics. The fl ux of GCR particles varies inversely with the solar cycle by approximately a factor of two and is much greater during solar minimum. The fourth source of space radiation occurs when HZE particles impact solid material, such as the wall of a spacecraft, human skin, IMD casing, or any other medium. The impact generates a shower of secondary particles, which can carry suffi cient energy to cause damage to electronic circuits ( 25 ) . Finally, though not intrinsic to the space environment, electromagnetic interference (EMI) from the normal operation of spacecraft electronics can affect IMD function.
Due to similarities between terrestrial and space environment radiation in both exposure level and character, terrestrial reports of the effects of radiation exposure upon IMDs can provide insight into the potential effects of similar exposures in the space environment. This report will review those effects and use terrestrial data to extrapolate the impact of radiation in the space environment. This extrapolation can then be used to provide recommendations regarding mitigation of adverse effects on IMDs in the commercial spacefl ight arena.
METHODS
A systematic review was conducted in PubMed, Web of Science, the Defense Technical Information Center, and Google Scholar for all available literature on human studies involving radiation and IMDs. The search terms included " radiation, " " implanted medical device, " " pacemaker, " " defi brillator, " " spinal stimulator, " " deep brain stimulator, " " neurostimulator, " " insulin pump, " " electromagnetic interference, " " diagnostic radiation, " " computed tomography, " " magnetic resonance, " and " radiation therapy. " All titles obtained from these criteria were reviewed. Studies published in a language other than English without available translation and articles regarding IMDs that did not specifi cally address EMI or radiation were discarded. All other articles were reviewed in their entirety. Data characterizing the space radiation environment were obtained from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the National Academy of Sciences technical documentation and publications archives, while background information concerning the effects of radiation on electronics was provided by the Space Radiation Analysis Group at NASA ' s Jet Propulsion Laboratory and Johnson Space Center.
Using these methods, 45 references were identifi ed that met search criteria and addressed the topics of interest. Of these, fi ve were published in languages other than English, without available translations, and six addressed spacefl ight concerns outside the scope of this article, such as long-duration orbital or interplanetary fl ights. The remaining 34 studies were included in the review. Literature obtained includes in vitro and in vivo studies, case studies, technical reports, white papers, device operating manuals, and review articles. Most of the relevant literature was for CIDs, such as pacemakers and defi brillators; however, as CIDs are generally the most common and most critical applications of therapeutic device implantation technology, literature regarding CIDs was considered a useful proxy for other IMDs.
Radiation doses are often given in Grays (Gy) or Sieverts (Sv). Gy are a measure of absorbed dose and are commonly used in the medical literature reviewed. Sv are used to quantify biological exposure and vary depending on the type of radiation and tissue exposed. A tissue-weighting factor is applied to the absorbed dose to yield an equivalent biologic dose in Sv ( 7 ) . In this document, each unit is used where appropriate; readers should note that, while relative dosages are often close to 1:1, these units are not interchangeable and depend upon the type of radiation and the relative susceptibility of the tissue in question.
RESULTS
The literature review revealed a number of papers addressing the effects of radiation on IMDs, particularly CIDs, and the potential for levels of radiation seen within the space environment to affect IMD function. Much of the literature addressed terrestrial sources of radiation exposure; where possible, such data have been extrapolated for relevance to the space environment.
Effects of Electromagnetic Interference
EMI exposure can result in transient effects on CIDs, which resolve when the EMI ends or when the CID is moved away from the source of EMI emission ( 14 , 20 ) . CID manufacturers include countermeasures against EMI, such as specialized casings, signal fi lters, interference rejection circuits, feed-through capacitors to block environmental EMI (such as cellular phone interference), and bandpass fi lters to fi lter out unwanted cardiac and other muscle electrical signals ( 1 , 31 , 38 ) . Despite these countermeasures, EMI may still cause device malfunction, especially with intermittent exposure from high-output devices at frequencies that overlap the cardiac signal range (0-60 Hz) ( 1 , 38 ) . Device algorithms monitor signals that occur over a set period of time. If the fi lter period is exceeded, spurious signals are interpreted as noise. However, intermittent EMI that falls within the fi lter period may be interpreted as cardiac activity ( 20 ) . If EMI is interpreted as cardiac activity in a pacemaker-dependent patient, this could theoretically result in withheld pacing and subsequent dysrhythmia or even induce unsynchronized defi brillation from an implanted defi brillator. Additionally, EMI may reset the pacemaker into a default pacing mode or interfere with data recording ( 1 , 20 ) .
Despite theoretical risks, there are few cases of environmental EMI actually leading to CID malfunction in the literature. Studies have examined the effects of environmental technologies with EMI output in normal work environments and their effect on CIDs, and most demonstrate that even EMI-outputting devices in close proximity to CIDs have little to no effect on CID function ( 1 , 29 , 31 ) . Avionics in normal fl ight environments, including general aviation and commercial airline fl ights, demonstrate no signifi cant interference leading to CID malfunction from EMI output from onboard equipment ( 8 , 28 ) . Improvements in shielding techniques, including nanomagnetic insulation in lead design and hermetically sealed cases, have provided improved protection for CIDs exposed to EMI ( 1 ). High-output devices designed to emit high-frequency electric current for treatment purposes, such as electrosurgical devices or nerve stimulators, can cause signifi cant, directed EMI and transient effects on CIDs in the direct EMI fi eld; however, the use of such devices is generally limited to hospital environments ( 1 , 16 , 38 ) . In general, most literature sources suggest that environmental and industrial sources of EMI are likely safe, but recommend limited exposure time and maximal distance between the source and the CID ( 1 ).
Neurostimulators are currently used for treating seizure, depression, incontinence, tremor, and pain. Unlike CIDs, they generally perform a continuous or timed function, without sensing ( 26 ) . Because they have no sensing capability they are less sensitive to EMI ( 26 ) . Studies have demonstrated that shorter leads are less susceptible to EMI and that devices must be located very near to the emitting source in order to be affected ( 27 ) . Finally, effects of EMI on neurostimulators are transient and cease when emissions are stopped ( 26 ) . One review of Federal Drug Administration adverse event data for deep brain neurostimulators noted that there were a total of 76 adverse events associated with EMI reported from 1999 to 2005, including 9 events involving deep brain stimulators and 67 events involving spinal stimulators ( 9 ) . Adverse events included altered settings, devices that were inappropriately turned off, abnormal shocks, increased stimulation, and device failure ( 9 ) . However, the vast majority of these events were transient malfunctions causing pain or irritation from spinal stimulation after the patient had passed through strong magnetic fi elds such as highly magnetized metal detectors ( 9 ) . Adverse effects from more common electronics in every day environments have not been reported.
Effects of Diagnostic and Therapeutic Radiation Exposure
Like EMI, diagnostic radiation effects are transient and usually end when the IMD is removed from the radiation fi eld or radiation is stopped. Diagnostic radiation levels (most commonly 10-65 mGy, with maximal dosages of as high as 100 mGy) have been demonstrated to cause device malfunctions, particularly in CIDs ( 18 ) . The most common malfunctions observed are over-sensing errors, occasionally accompanied by device inhibition with failure to pace or defi brillate ( 18 ) . At maximal dosages, malfunctions such as device reset are occasionally observed ( 18 ) . The liberation of free electrons by diagnostic radiation may create small current fl ows (photocurrent) that are interpreted as cardiac activity, leading to over-sensing; again, these effects are only seen while CIDs remain directly in the radiation path ( 18 ) .
Higher levels of ionizing radiation are often used as treatment modalities. Many studies demonstrate significant effects of therapeutic radiation doses, including IMD failure. It has been consistently demonstrated that defi brillators are generally more sensitive to radiation than pacemakers ( 15 , 17 , 22 ) . Pacemakers have been demonstrated to malfunction with as low as 10 Gy of irradiation, with failures occurring at doses ranging from 20 -130 Gy ( 15 , 17 , 36 ) . One study demonstrated pacemaker tolerance of up to 60 Gy prior to failure; however, this study was a demonstration of radiation mitigation protocol for CIDs, with maximal precautions taken ( 36 ) . The most common device failure identifi ed is loss of device output, though premature battery replacement warnings are also commonly reported ( 14 ) . In contrast, defi brillators have demonstrated malfunctions with irradiation of as low as 0.4 Gy, with common malfunctions including low shock energy and ineffective defi brillation, partial reset, and loss of historical data ( 15 , 17 ) . Devices outside of the direct radiation beam path exposed to high levels of only indirect radiation have malfunctioned; however, no failures have been reported without direct irradiation ( 17 ) . Defi brillator failure has been identifi ed at as low as 0.5 Gy of direct exposure, again demonstrating lower tolerance to irradiation than pacemakers ( 15 ) . Defi brillator device instructions are stored in rewritable random access memory, which is more easily corrupted and could account for the increased sensitivity to radiation ( 30 ) . Comparative effects of varying levels of radiation exposure on CIDs are provided in Table I . Cardiac device manufacturers have variable dose limit and shielding recommendations for their devices ( 3 , 30 ) . All manufacturers suggest placing the device outside of an expected radiation fi eld whenever possible, and most recommend a cardiology consult before and after treatment ( 21 , 30 ) 
Aerospace Radiation Exposure and Device Malfunction
The SEU rate in any electronic device is proportional to the particle fl ux in a given environment, which increases with altitude, and to the susceptibility of a given circuit. As integrated circuits steadily get smaller and operate at lower voltages, ionizing particles can more easily change the memory state of a device ( 19 , 30 ) . Integrated circuits contain several types of gate technologies, including antifuse, fl ash, and static random access memory (SRAM). Antifuse and fl ash gates require high voltage to change and are thus less susceptible to SEU. In contrast, SRAMs are low-energy, reprogrammable circuits that are often used to store device operating parameters and, due to their low-power state, they are susceptible to ionizing radiation ( 19 ) . While memory errors can be corrected by subroutines that perform periodic rewrites of the SRAM, these areas of SRAM that hold the device confi guration data are also subject to SEU ( 3 , 19 ). An SEU in this particular block of memory would result in a " hard " error or device failure. In one study that specifi cally addressed the aviation environment, estimates of SEUs in the confi guration memory of some SRAMs resulted in mean time between failures of 1.23 to 2.61 mo at altitudes of 40,000 ft (12, 192 m) ( 19 , 37 ) . Other studies have demonstrated software errors directly attributable to the effect of GCR on CIDs ( 5 , 10 ). Radiation exposure during cross-country and international airline fl ights has been suffi cient to cause SEUs; while no reported incidents have resulted in signifi cant clinical manifestations, such cases have resulted in the patient ' s loss of confi dence in their device ( 10 ) . However, with a relatively low number of reported errors, it is diffi cult to extrapolate the malfunction or failure rates for potential exposures during suborbital or orbital fl ight.
At sea level, background radiation from various sources delivers 3.6 mSv per year to the average person ( 25 ) . About half of this terrestrial exposure is from radon gas, with the remainder from GCR (0.26 mSv/yr) and other natural and artifi cial sources ( 25 ) . Occupational exposures to radiation workers and astronauts can be higher. At 25,000 to 40,000 ft (8000 to 12,000 m) of altitude, where most commercial airliners fl y, the dose rate is 3-7 m Sv/h, for an average of about 0.025 mSv for a 5-h cross-country fl ight, or 0.05 mSv for a round trip ( 24 , 32 ). In comparison, the dose for a chest x-ray is about 0.05 to 0.2 mSv ( 11 , 24 , 32 ) . A high-altitude ( . 40,000 ft/12,192 m) dose rate is about 0.02 mSv/h and an orbital dose would be approximately 0.2-1.0 mSv per day ( 11 , 32 ) . Comparative radiation doses are provided in Fig. 1 .
A suborbital fl ight from a mid-latitude launch site, with only about 5 min at maximum altitude ( ; 100 km /62 mi), would expose occupants up to an estimated radiation dose of 0.0026 mSv, signifi cantly less than the 0.05 mSv dose for a typical round-trip, cross-country airline fl ight ( 32 , 33 ) . If such a suborbital fl ight were to take (14) Pacemaker ( place during a typical SPE, estimated dosage ranges from 0.1-1.0 mSv ( 32 , 33 ) . Assuming an approximate 1:1 conversion to mGy, these doses are much less than those associated with CID malfunction ( Ն 40 mGy) and failure ( Ն 500 mGy) ( 14 , 15 , 17 ) . Anticipated radiation exposures by fl ight profi les are provided in Table II . Radiation exposure for orbital fl ight can also be extrapolated from modeled and historical exposure data. Orbits can be divided into low-altitude and low-inclination, such as early Space Shuttle fl ights, or high-altitude with high-inclination, as with the International Space Station. According to one model, 10 d on orbit during a solar minimum behind 10 g · cm 2 13 of aluminum shielding would limit exposure to approximately 3 -5 mSv at low-latitude and 12 -25 mSv during high-latitude orbital fl ights ( 32 ) . The dosages predicted by this model compare favorably with actual mission data from Mercury through NASA-MIR missions, where exposure rates of 0.18 to 21 mSv were seen ( 7 , 32 ) . A 10-d dose maximum of 25 mGy corresponds to levels that approach potential CID malfunction, where malfunction has been observed at Ն 40 mGy ( 14 , 15 , 17 ) . With these predicted levels, it would take 200 d of accumulated radiation exposure to approach the 500-mGy radiation level where CID (defibrillator) failure is fi rst observed ( 14 , 15 , 17 ) . Actual effects could vary signifi cantly depending on the type and amount of shielding, the type of IMD, the orbital parameters, and the type of radiation. Extrapolated dosages of radiation according to mission profi le and anticipated effects on IMDs exposed to the fl ight profi le indicated. SPE 5 solar particle event; GCR 5 galactic cosmic radiation; mGy 5 milliGray; SEU 5 single event upset. 
DISCUSSION
While literature on these topics is scarce, the case reports and manuscripts cited give insight into the likely effects of radiation that might be expected in the commercial space environment. Literature correlates suggest that SFPs with IMDs should have no greater impact from a suborbital fl ight than during a cross-country airline fl ight during normal levels of SPE activity, and may not be signifi cantly more affected by suborbital fl ight during a major SPE. Further, even short-duration orbital fl ight appears to fall within radiation dosages commonly seen with treatment radiation modalities. Finally, onboard sources of EMI are unlikely to cause signifi cant interaction or disruption of IMD function based on terrestrial industrial and environmental correlates. Based on these literature findings, some conclusions and recommendations can be made regarding the use of IMDs in the space environ ment.
Existing guidelines for the management of IMD during radiation therapy are conservative and can be easily adapted to commercial spacefl ight applications. Guidelines based on the literature for the management of IMDs during radiation therapy ( 9 , 35 ) are adapted for SFPs and shown below:
Prefl ight
Identify all persons with IMDs Obtain manufacturer specifi c data, date of implantation, complications Obtain last device check results and current function Assess degree of device dependence and severity of symptoms without device Determine if the device can be turned off or put in " safe mode " ? Brief SFP about the space radiation environment Brief SFP about device management during spacefl ight Determine potential radiation dose to the device Perform prefl ight physical exam and device interrogation (if no recent data) Perform ECG for persons with CID Consult with appropriate device specialist as needed Brief fl ight crew or on-orbit physician/medical personnel about potential IMD issues Provide for relevant on-call specialist
In Flight
Use an appropriately placed dosimeter Monitor SFP vitals during spacefl ight, if possible Instruct SFP to self-monitor for device malfunction Instruct SFP to turn off or place device in " safe mode " if applicable Provide SFP with back-up device or treatment, if possible Ensure an AED with pacer function is available for CID-dependent SFPs on orbital fl ights Brief on-orbit physician/medical personnel on IMD management
Postfl ight
Perform physical exam of patient, including ECG for persons with CID Perform full interrogation of device if any in-fl ight anomalies occurred Follow-up with specialist as needed Obtain weekly vital signs measurements and symptom checks for at least 6 wk Interrogate device periodically for SFPs with cardiac or other critical IMDs Perform IMD reprogramming or replacement as needed IMD management for SFPs should include prefl ight evaluation, in-fl ight monitoring, and postfl ight followup. Prefl ight evaluation should consist of a physical exam, device interrogation, and expert consultation as needed to ensure device stability. The primary preventable risk factor is the mere identifi cation of persons with IMDs and confi rmation that they are outside of the initial postsurgical period following device placement ( 13 ) . While not directly related to radiation concerns, ensuring that SFPs with IMDs have had at least 1 yr of normal device function from the time of placement may prevent other IMD-related issues, such as lead displacement ( 6 ) . Finally, the potential effects of space radiation on an IMD should be made clear to SFPs for appropriate informed consent for participation.
Accurate space weather forecasting is a basic requirement of normal spacefl ight operations and may be essential for predicting IMD radiation exposure ( 25 ) . Mission holds may be appropriate for extreme SPE for commercial launches. IMDs should be evaluated to determine whether they pose a risk of EMI with spacecraft systems or vice versa and, whenever possible, SFPs with an IMD should be positioned away from any EMI source or strong magnetic fi eld ( 14 , 20 ) . In-fl ight monitoring of SFPs with IMDs may be limited as onboard medical monitors may not be available. Remote monitoring of the SFP by periodic vital sign assessment may be helpful; similarly, wireless interrogation of an IMD may be useful in some scenarios, though this capability would be dependent upon available telemetry options in a given spacecraft. If possible, the SFP could be briefed before fl ight to monitor their IMD and potentially place the device in safe mode as appropriate. Alternatives to IMD therapy, such as medication control, could be explored to limit IMD dependence for the duration of the fl ight. Postfl ight care should involve a postfl ight exam and follow-up on any anomalies.
Interestingly, the literature reports relatively low dosages of radiation, particularly diagnostic radiation, resulting in electronic failure of devices ( 18 ) . However, most electronic device failures are secondary to cumulative radiation exposure, with total ionizing doses of 10 s of Gy. For failures occurring at dosages as low as reported here, in the 10 -100 mGy range, failures are likely photocurrent (dose rate) induced due to the high sensitivity of the devices examined. As these results are consistent throughout the literature, implanted cardiac devices in particular do seem to be quite sensitive to radiation in comparison to other electronics, perhaps due to the rhythm-sensing functions.
In the space environment, SEUs and SELs may be caused by proton or heavy ion exposure, which would be quite rare and limited in the altitudes expected for short-duration suborbital spacefl ight. None of the devices discussed here have been characterized for proton or heavy ion-induced SEUs or SELs; as such, this remains an unknown risk. While unlikely to be of consequence in low-altitude suborbital fl ights, this may pose a signifi cant problem for future orbital or interplanetary travel. Further study and device testing is warranted to evaluate this risk. Due to the unique aspect of this work there are other limitations as well. CIDs dominate the relevant studies addressing IMDs, with few studies addressing other types of devices. While CIDs make an excellent proxy due to their critical function and higher sensitivity, the impacts on other types of IMDs are less well known, and the total number of studies and actual devices examined is low compared to the number and types of devices in use. The electronics contained in IMDs are constantly evolving and may become more or less susceptible to radiation as technology changes, and the space radiation environment may be relatively quiescent or more active than reported in the historical record ( 25 ) . Further, as onboard electrical equipment may generate greater EMI emissions than terrestrial and aviation correlates, prefl ight testing for EMI interference with IMD function may be warranted to ensure that no signifi cant interference occurs. Additionally, the references used in this paper report radiation in Sv, Gy or both. Sv is a biologic dose that is tissue dependent and derived by application of tissue factor; therefore Sv and Gy are not strictly equivalent. However, this may lend a degree of conservatism to this work, as a numerically equivalent dose in Sv often represents slightly more radiation than in Gy ( 4 , 34 ) . Finally, it is worth noting that the IMDrelated medical literature reviewed usually report total doses administered; however, many of the detrimental effects on IMDs can be caused by a single ionizing radiation particle, leading to SEUs. Therefore even low total doses, in some circumstances, can cause device malfunction; it is for this reason that even conservative estimates of radiation susceptibility must be considered as estimates of risk, not predictions of outcome.
Although no dose of ionizing radiation can be declared " safe " for IMDs according to some device manufacturers, literature suggests that SFPs with IMDs should incur no more risk from space environment radiation than a cross-country airline fl ight, and may thus participate in suborbital fl ight as long as sensible precautions are taken. SFPs that are device-dependent should be limited to suborbital and short orbital fl ights ( Յ 10 d) to limit potential malfunctions, at least until IMD electronics are more robust or shielding is improved. Future work in this area could involve documentation of IMD performance data during actual fl ight, as well as collection of radiation exposure data with in-fl ight dosimetry monitoring. These data should be thoroughly evaluated before estimations of risk are extrapolated for longer orbital or interplanetary missions. Ultimately, the decision to participate in spaceflight despite known medical conditions will be dependent upon a mutual agreement by the SFP, fl ight surgeons, and commercial entities to accept potential risk in an effort to help these individuals achieve their dreams of spacefl ight.
